That was not a political question. It was a question of equal rights for all.
“Separate but equal is inherently unequal.”
Clearly the Constitution grants SCOTUS review over that issue.
Gerrymandering done solely on the basis of political affiliation is exclusively a political question.
Were Congress to enact a law forbidding the drawing of electoral maps based on party affiliation that would grant SCOTUS the power to review politically gerrymandered maps.
As I said initially, it’s a bad result that was (IMO) correctly decided.
Nope. You just have to read Kagan's dissent to find plenty of precedent that gerrymandering and other attempts to reduce the weight of certain voters votes violates EP (and 1st Amendment):
The Fourteenth Amendment, we
long ago recognized, “guarantees the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election” of legislators.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 566 (1964). And that
opportunity “can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id., at
555.
As Justice Kennedy (in a
controlling opinion) once hypothesized: If districters declared that they were drawing a map “so as most to burden [the votes of] Party X’s” supporters, it would violate
the Equal Protection Clause. Vieth, 541 U. S., at 312. For
(in the language of the one-person-one-vote decisions) it
would infringe those voters’ rights to “equal [electoral]
participation.” Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 566; see Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379–380 (1963) (“The concept of
‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet
the basic qualifications”).
n. Yet
partisan gerrymanders subject certain voters to “disfavored treatment”—again, counting their votes for less—
precisely because of “their voting history [and] their expression of political views.” Vieth, 541 U. S., at 314 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). And added to that strictly personal
harm is an associational one. Representative democracy is
“unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band
together in [support of] candidates who espouse their
political views.” California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U. S. 567, 574 (2000). By diluting the votes of certain
citizens, the State frustrates their efforts to translate
those affiliations into political effectiveness. See Gill, 585
U. S., at ___ (KAGAN, J., concurring) (slip op., at 9) (“Members of the disfavored party[,] deprived of their natural
political strength[,] may face difficulties fundraising,
registering voters, [and] eventually accomplishing their
policy objectives”). In both those ways, partisan gerrymanders of the kind we confront here undermine the
protections of “democracy embodied in the First Amendment.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 357 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Though different Justices have described the constitutional harm in diverse ways, nearly all have agreed on this
much: Extreme partisan gerrymandering (as happened in
North Carolina and Maryland) violates the Constitution.
See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U. S., at 293 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n
excessive injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful”
(emphasis deleted)); id., at 316 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(“[P]artisan gerrymandering that disfavors one party is
[im]permissible”); id., at 362 (BREYER, J., dissenting)
(Gerrymandering causing political “entrenchment” is a
“violat[ion of] the Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 132 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (“
nconstitutional discrimination”
occurs “when the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade [a voter’s] influence on the
political process”); id., at 165 (Powell, J., concurring)
(“Unconstitutional gerrymandering” occurs when “the
boundaries of the voting districts have been distorted
deliberately” to deprive voters of “an equal opportunity to
participate in the State’s legislative processes”). Once
again, the majority never disagrees; it appears to accept
the “principle that each person must have an equal say in
the election of representatives.”
