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SCOTUS decisions

I'm probably reading this wrong, but for the "narrowly tailored" portion it seems the Court is saying that the government could have just taken on the costs itself and since there is a scheme for them to do so with non-profits then they can do it instead of putting the costs on employers. While I do think the government has trouble explaining away the distinction between non-profits and for-profit groups, while simultaneously doing a poor job of arguing this point, I think it's somewhat obtuse to say that the government should be required to take on the specific insurance costs of a closely-held corporation's insurance costs for portions they object on "sincerely held religious grounds" when the ACA is attempting to set up a scheme where this is not the case.

I may be interpreting this wrong, but it goes back to what I said earlier: I don't understand how this can't just be used as a cop-out for everything in the private industry now. "Government didn't debunk the theory that it would be absurd for them to just pay for it themselves, therefore this legislation isn't narrowly tailored."
 
Agree with this. Alito's best point, and the one Ginsburg never really answered was how the HHS can define "person" in include people and non-profits, but not closely-held for-profits. Looked to me like Alito was trying to patch over the slippery slope problem you point out by saying that the views of a publicly-traded corporation are so dispersed that it's impossible for it to adhere to any one religious practice.

Ginsburg's strongest point, I thought, was that it doesn't substantially burden their practice. Alito talked a lot about the burden that would be placed on HL if they didn't provide the required coverage, but not how it would burden them if they did comply with the statute.

Bottom line, IMO, is that the RFRA needs to be changed to explicitly exclude for-profit corporations. Should be an easy fix, but nothing's ever easy with Congress.

Yeah I don't know enough about the RFRA to really comment on it, but I don't know that they thought the term "persons" would include for-profit corporations. It seems like there are arguments on both sides.

Obviously RFRA should be amended to exclude for-profit corporations though IMO.
 
I figured as much. I do think if the Court wanted to find a distinction between for-profit and non-profit corporations in cases like this that would be the place to look. It's much easier, IMO, for a non-profit that incurs any financial burden for exercise of religion to claim that the burden is substantial. The financial loss would prevent the non-profit from fulfilling its religious (or partly religious) purpose since all the funds it has go towards that mission (in theory).

When a for-profit corporation suffers a financial burden for exercise of religion it can be said that it's non-religious purpose (making profit) is being stymied more-so than it's religious purpose. For the burden on religious exercise to truly be "substantial" the financial burden would have to pretty much wipe out the non-religious purpose in order be said to infringe substantially upon the religious purpose.

Well it also seems to me that the reason there's a scheme in place for non-profits to be exempt was to throw churches and religious groups a bone in the first place. Therefore for the majority to turn around and say "well you already provided it to other religious organizations so you need to provide it here" can either be viewed as consistency from the Court or somewhat of a cop out.
 
Just thinking ahead, I don't really know what widespread impact this case will have. Closely-held corporations can opt out of this specific provision if they apply for a waiver, but I can't really think of another topic where they would be allowed to cite substantial beliefs that aren't already protected as a compelling interest for the government in a narrowly tailored way. Obviously race and gender are going to be compelling and override any individual substantial belief (although there might be a small amount of litigation on these fronts stemming from this case) but what else could arise? Employers can already fire people for being gay in the majority of states (I believe it's still the majority) so they don't need the RFRA explanation for that.

What other topics out there exist that employers can claim RFRA protection for that won't easily be defeated by the government's narrowly tailored compelling interest? I legitimately can't think of one. Taxes won't fall under this for the rationale given by Alito and the Lee case, so anything related to that will be stripped.

The more I think about it and after reading the case, I think this is a relatively meaningless case that is very, very narrowly scoped to this particular issue. It will of course get religious nuts riled up about taking back the country and establishing that this is religious America, and it will of course get the "this is an assault on women's rights" crowd going, but what else is the impact?
 
Just thinking ahead, I don't really know what widespread impact this case will have. Closely-held corporations can opt out of this specific provision if they apply for a waiver, but I can't really think of another topic where they would be allowed to cite substantial beliefs that aren't already protected as a compelling interest for the government in a narrowly tailored way. Obviously race and gender are going to be compelling and override any individual substantial belief (although there might be a small amount of litigation on these fronts stemming from this case) but what else could arise? Employers can already fire people for being gay in the majority of states (I believe it's still the majority) so they don't need the RFRA explanation for that.

What other topics out there exist that employers can claim RFRA protection for that won't easily be defeated by the government's narrowly tailored compelling interest? I legitimately can't think of one.

RJ will be back in an hour or so. I'm sure he will have thought of plenty.
 
Just thinking ahead, I don't really know what widespread impact this case will have. Closely-held corporations can opt out of this specific provision if they apply for a waiver, but I can't really think of another topic where they would be allowed to cite substantial beliefs that aren't already protected as a compelling interest for the government in a narrowly tailored way. Obviously race and gender are going to be compelling and override any individual substantial belief (although there might be a small amount of litigation on these fronts stemming from this case) but what else could arise? Employers can already fire people for being gay in the majority of states (I believe it's still the majority) so they don't need the RFRA explanation for that.

What other topics out there exist that employers can claim RFRA protection for that won't easily be defeated by the government's narrowly tailored compelling interest? I legitimately can't think of one. Taxes won't fall under this for the rationale given by Alito and the Lee case, so anything related to that will be stripped.

The more I think about it and after reading the case, I think this is a relatively meaningless case that is very, very narrowly scoped to this particular issue. It will of course get religious nuts riled up about taking back the country and establishing that this is religious America, and it will of course get the "this is an assault on women's rights" crowd going, but what else is the impact?

Pretty much where I stand. This gives a pro life businesses an out with Morning after abortion pills. Other than that I don't think it is a huge deal.
 
There is clearly a point at which imposing a financial burden on a for-profit company would be extreme enough to constitute oppression of religious beliefs but I don't know if Hobby Lobby reaches that point. The financial burden of opting out of insurance and paying a penalty would be slight, if any.

The majority's response to this seems to be that Hobby Lobby has legitimate religious reasons for providing health insurance. But health insurance is really just a form of compensation from HL's standpoint, so if it feels that strongly about providing health insurance it can increase employees compensation such that they can purchase their own insurance.

I disagree with the majority's decision I just don't think it's as atrocious as many are making it out to be.

Isn't there a self-selection process going on with HL's employees? HL didn't offer certain forms of birth control before ACA and they're not paying for those forms of birth control now. If that benefit is key to an employee, clearly they can find other employers who will pay for those forms of birth control. There's mobility to labor, so if that's absolutely your key selection criteria on where to work you're not precluded from working somewhere else. Kinda think the similar principles apply to wedding photographers or bakers who oppose marriage equality. Don't think they should be allowed to discriminate, but why would you entrust a (presumably one-time event) to someone who doesn't share your values and may do a crappy job, thereby marring a special day for you?
 
Two and a half centuries of interpretation seems to be a fairly strong precedent.

Why didn't the founding fathers spell it out if they wanted Christians to have stronger protections? It's not like those dudes didn't understand the power of words
 
Isn't there a self-selection process going on with HL's employees? HL didn't offer certain forms of birth control before ACA and they're not paying for those forms of birth control now. If that benefit is key to an employee, clearly they can find other employers who will pay for those forms of birth control. There's mobility to labor, so if that's absolutely your key selection criteria on where to work you're not precluded from working somewhere else. Kinda think the similar principles apply to wedding photographers or bakers who oppose marriage equality. Don't think they should be allowed to discriminate, but why would you entrust a (presumably one-time event) to someone who doesn't share your values and may do a crappy job, thereby marring a special day for you?

The fact that you compared it to wedding photographers who discriminate against gay people demonstrates the flaw with that argument. The same reasoning would apply to a challenge against laws preventing a corporation from firing homosexuals.
 
Not if the constitution was formed with the intent to give special privileges to judeo christian values/faith. In my opinion it clearly was.

WTF are you talking about?
 
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