RChildress107
Well-known member
To put it more simply for you Junebug: do you think our federal courts operate more like our state courts, and the English courts they were founded on, or like modern day courts in Austria?
While I know it can be difficult to look beyond the obvious distinction between common law and statutory law, the main principle that governs all American courts is stare decisis. That’s true whether it’s a state court examining a statute, a federal court examining a statute, a state court examining a common law question, or a federal court examining a common law question. The case will almost always come down to the majority’s interpretation of what other judges have said before them.
Scalia’s assertion that:
“A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its pruriencei. e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages. And the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President -since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President.”
has little, if anything, to do with the words of the first amendment, and everything to do with his interpretation of what other judges have said about the first amendment (or really what other judges have said about what other judges have said about what other judges have said . . . about the first amendment).
While I know it can be difficult to look beyond the obvious distinction between common law and statutory law, the main principle that governs all American courts is stare decisis. That’s true whether it’s a state court examining a statute, a federal court examining a statute, a state court examining a common law question, or a federal court examining a common law question. The case will almost always come down to the majority’s interpretation of what other judges have said before them.
Scalia’s assertion that:
“A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its pruriencei. e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages. And the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President -since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President.”
has little, if anything, to do with the words of the first amendment, and everything to do with his interpretation of what other judges have said about the first amendment (or really what other judges have said about what other judges have said about what other judges have said . . . about the first amendment).
