• Welcome to OGBoards 10.0, keep in mind that we will be making LOTS of changes to smooth out the experience here and make it as close as possible functionally to the old software, but feel free to drop suggestions or requests in the Tech Support subforum!

IMF Admits Failure (In Which Tuffalo Reads A Report So You Don't Have To)

TuffaloDeac10

🌹☭
Joined
Mar 15, 2011
Messages
13,517
Reaction score
487
Location
Hacker-Festzelt
I don't think this is getting enough attention.

The IMF has released their new World Economic Outlook. It's gloomy, but there's a fascinating (maybe?) bit at the end of Chapter 1 - Box 1.1, "Are We Underestimating Short-Term Fiscal Multipliers?," co-written by the IMF's chief economist - that deals with the all-important fiscal multiplier. Essentially, Keynesians believe that multipliers are larger than 1 at certain times and government spending will boost economic output in those conditions. If you can spend $100B to get, say, a 125B increase in GDP, that's a good deal. Austerians, on the other hand, believe that multipliers are less than 1 and that increases in government spending don't grow the economy by as much as their cost. The IMF has long been in the <1 camp (of course, as a lender of last resort, it's sort of their job to think that way).

So we have this multiplier, which pretty much everyone thinks exists, but the size of it has a lot of implications for policy. If it's less than 1, fiscal stimulus isn't a great idea and it's actually a good time for fiscal consolidation. If the fiscal multiplier greater than 1, we should open the Keynesian stimulus floodgates in order to end this depression now. I'll let the IMF's Chief Economist take it from here (Emphasis mine):

[A] debate has been raging about the size of fiscal multipliers. The smaller the multipliers, the less costly the fiscal consolidation. At the same time, activity has disappointed in a number of economies undertaking fiscal consolidation...

The main finding, based on data for 28 economies, is that the multipliers used in generating growth forecasts have been systematically too low since the start of the Great Recession, by 0.4 to 1.2, depending on the forecast source and the specifics of the estimation approach. Informal evidence suggests that the multipliers implicitly used to generate these forecasts are about 0.5. So actual multipliers may be higher, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7.

But fiscal consolidations have been more costly than realized, and they have a chart to show that

imf+forecast+errors.jpg


I also really like this chart, though it is from the unabashedly partisan Brad Delong and not something the IMF used

6a00e551f080038834017c31c4fb04970b-pi


But why has this been so? The IMF is back,

If the multipliers underlying the growth forecasts were about 0.5, as this informal evidence suggests, our results indicate that multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 to 1.7 range since the Great Recession. This finding is consistent with research suggesting that in today’s environment of substantial economic slack, monetary policy constrained by the zero lower bound, and synchronized fiscal adjustment across numerous economies, multipliers may be well above 1 (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Batini, Callegari, and Melina, 2012; IMF, 2012b; Woodford, 2011; and others). More work on how fiscal multipliers depend on time and economic conditions is warranted.

In other words, fiscal policy may act differently in depressions than in boom times. This makes sense, there isn't exactly a lot of private investment for government borrowing to be crowding out today. Monetary policy may play a role as well; a low multiplier seems very plausible when Alan Greenspan says he'll lower interest rates in exchange for deficit reduction but when monetary policy is committed to working alongside and not against fiscal policy, a larger multiplier seems obvious. I don't expect to see Rick Santelli get on TV and say "Wow I blew my load over some pretty bad economics."

Another current IMF report weighs in:

Countries that have more room to maneuver should let automatic stabilizers operate around the path currently envisaged in cyclically adjusted terms. Should growth disappoint, the first line of defense should be monetary policy and the free play of automatic stabilizers. If growth should fall significantly below current World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections, countries with room for maneuver should smooth their planned adjustment over 2013 and beyond

Even in light of larger-than-realized multipliers, the IMF can't entirely shake its institutional bias in favor of austerity and advise countries with with low borrowing costs to forget austerity instead of "smoothing" it, but that's part of its institutional makeup and culture; dear reader, it need not be a part of your thinking.

The findings from the IMF suggest that Obama, DeacMan, jhmd, 2&2, DODO, Romney, Ryan, and ESPECIALLY Pete Peterson and Erskine Bowles are all barking up the wrong tree. We don't need to fiscal consolidation in the short term, we need J-O-B-S JOBS and they way to get them is through stimulus, as much monetary stimulus as we can do, and as much fiscal stimulus as possible. There's a scheduled payroll tax increase later this year, hopefully politicians will remove their heads from their anuses and cancel that. That would be a good start.
 
Last edited:
So you are saying Krugman was right in saying the stimulus was way too low.
 
I found it fascinating. My amateur theory has always been that you spend in recessions and you save in booms. We should have been cutting back on government from 1995-2008 and instead we were spending. Thus when 2008 hit, we had no real place to go to create money. Now we are kind of stuck, but neither candidate is offering real short term austerity to be honest. Both want to spend early, the difference in me is that I believe that the 'R Train' (haha) has some gumption to cut spending long term.

Good article and emphasis. Thanks.
 
I think you are relying on faulty assumptions that: (1) the spending would remain in the U.S.; and (2) the spending would be in areas resulting in jobs. I don't think you can make those asusmptions in today's political environment.
 
I found it fascinating. My amateur theory has always been that you spend in recessions and you save in booms. We should have been cutting back on government from 1995-2008 and instead we were spending. Thus when 2008 hit, we had no real place to go to create money. Now we are kind of stuck, but neither candidate is offering real short term austerity to be honest. Both want to spend early, the difference in me is that I believe that the 'R Train' (haha) has some gumption to cut spending long term.

Good article and emphasis. Thanks.

Box 2 (page 39) in the second report is about just this very idea!

Box 2. lessons from Sweden

1. The building up of fiscal buffers during good times, together with credible fiscal institutions, provides room to maneuver during bad times.
...On the eve of the crisis, Sweden enjoyed a fiscal surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP, compared with an average deficit of 1.1 percent of GDP among advanced economies. Indeed, the debt-to-GDP ratio in Sweden had fallen from 70 percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 2007...

The authorities’ expansionary policy was not called into question by markets because of the low level of the deficit and the credibility of Sweden’s comprehensive fiscal policy framework—including a top-down budget process, a fiscal surplus target of 1 percent of GDP over the output cycle, a ceiling for central government expenditure set three years in advance, a balanced-budget requirement for local governments, and an independent fiscal council.

2. Central bank credibility allows monetary policy to be used aggressively.
...During the crisis, the Riksbank lowered its target short-term interest rate nearly to zero and implemented sweeping liquidity measures...

3. A flexible exchange rate can help absorb the shock.
During the crisis, the krona fell in value against both the dollar and the euro as investors flocked to reserve currencies. It depreciated by 15 percent in real effective terms from mid-2008 to early 2009, supporting net exports and helping prop up economic activity

4. Decisive action to ensure financial sector soundness is crucial.
...The authorities took fast action to calm depositors and interbank markets, including a doubling and extension of the deposit guarantee and introduction of new bank recapitalization and debt guarantee schemes.

Quick read if you want to get beyond what I've quoted. It's good stuff.
 
So you are saying Krugman was right in saying the stimulus was way too low.

I've said that before but I don't think the IMF's mea culpa on the fiscal multiplier is exactly evidence of it. At any rate, when you want to make that argument, if you feel like you have to appeal to someone's authority, you are better off going with the Sveriges Riksbank "Nobel" Prize-winning professional economist himself and not me.
 
So I was reading this book about the study of history and this historian is just blasting social scientists, especially economists, and I didn't understand why. Seemed absurd. But tuff helped me understand, thanks
 
So I was reading this book about the study of history and this historian is just blasting social scientists, especially economists, and I didn't understand why. Seemed absurd. But tuff helped me understand, thanks

Does the book have a name? I'm fast approaching the end of my current reading list. The economics profession definitely deserves a lot of criticism, not least for Robert Lucas' 2003 pronouncement that the "central problem of depression-prevention has been solved for all practical purposes." Keynes said it best, "If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid!"
 
Imagine the shape our economy would be in right now without the spending during the Bush era? If we think our Post WWII domination of the world was something, our financial domination of the 21st century would be epic. Instead we are stuck in the same mess as everyone else, all because didn't have the foresight to cut back when we had excess. Instead we spent and spent, and now we have no reserves to survive on. We are the grasshopper when we should have been the ant.
 
The ironic thing is, that was Bin Laden / the Taliban's master plan - to cause the complete financial downfall of the U.S. As much as people do not want to hear it, we fell for it and I don't think they could have dreamed that it would have this much success.
 
We're still far far away from a "complete financial downfall." Even Greece would be far away from financial ruin if they still had their own printing press.
 
tuffalo are you getting your phd in economics?
 
tuffalo are you getting your phd in economics?

No I have some underlying math issue that renders me incapable of doing serious linear algebra and some kinds of integral and multivariate calculus. I only got like 90th percentile on the Math section of the GRE. I'd be totally, 100% hopeless as an econ phd applicant. I'm currently getting an MPA w/ a Community and Economic Development concentration.
 
No I have some underlying math issue that renders me incapable of doing serious linear algebra and some kinds of integral and multivariate calculus. I only got like 90th percentile on the Math section of the GRE. I'd be totally, 100% hopeless as an econ phd applicant. I'm currently getting an MPA w/ a Community and Economic Development concentration.

oh sorry to hear that. you seem so interested in economics that i thought it would be a good road for you
 
Did you actually read the whole report, or just the part that Krugman mentions in yesterday's blog post? Neither Blanchard nor the IMF have recommended an approach of fiscal expansion for debt-laden emerging market and advanced economies. The report mentions that the IMF may have underestimated multipliers, and that this may have led to fiscal consolidation that was too rapid in some economies. They are not by any measure abandoning their recommendations (or requirements, in some more dire cases) for fiscal consolidation. That graph you posted is nice, but it makes no attempt to differentiate between the debt burdens of the nations represented. Obviously Greece and Ireland have extremely low growth forecasts, but no sane person could reasonably argue that if they pursued fiscal expansion they would see growth levels that would exceed the current projections. More likely than not, total loss in investor confidence would result in a systematic default and the total collapse of their economies. And they would drag the rest of the EMU down with them. The problem isn't as simple as, "oh, their economies aren't growing, we should spend!". These countries have serious structural problems that have to be resolved before their economies can start growing again. Most significant are high labor costs. Which is why the IMF report also recommends lowering minimum wages and reducing union bargaining power.
 
Last edited:
Did you actually read the whole report, or just the part that Krugman mentions in his latest blog post? Neither Blanchard nor the IMF have recommended an approach of fiscal expansion for debt-laden emerging market and advanced economies. The report mentions that the IMF may have underestimated multipliers, and that this may have led to fiscal consolidation that was too rapid in some economies. They are not by any measure abandoning their recommendations (or requirements, in some more dire cases) for fiscal consolidation. That graph you posted is nice, but it makes no attempt to differentiate between the debt burdens of the nations represented. Obviously Greece and Ireland have extremely low growth forecasts, but no sane person could reasonably argue that if they pursued fiscal expansion they would see growth levels that would exceed the current projections. More likely than not, total loss in investor confidence would result in a systematic default and the total collapse of their economies. And they would drag the rest of the EMU down with them. The problem isn't as simple as, "oh, their economies aren't growing, we should spend!". These countries have serious structural problems that have to be resolved before their economies can start growing again. Most significant are high labor costs. Which is why the IMF report also recommends lowering minimum wages and reducing union bargaining power.

Did you even read my whole post?

"Even in light of larger-than-realized multipliers, the IMF can't entirely shake its institutional bias in favor of austerity and advise countries with with low borrowing costs to forget austerity instead of "smoothing" it, but that's part of its institutional makeup and culture; dear reader, it need not be a part of your thinking."
 
And not to be too defensive and butthurt, but

1 I saw this from FT Alphaville, not PK

2 I would have posted this thread yesterday if I didn't want to take the time to read the reports.
 
Did you even read my whole post?

"Even in light of larger-than-realized multipliers, the IMF can't entirely shake its institutional bias in favor of austerity and advise countries with with low borrowing costs to forget austerity instead of "smoothing" it, but that's part of its institutional makeup and culture; dear reader, it need not be a part of your thinking."

No, I stopped after the graph. Since you mention it, though, I think it's kind of funny you accuse the IMF of institutional bias. I don't remember hearing such accusations leveled at institutions recommending policy measures you agree with. Seems like a convenient way to dismiss their analysis out of hand.

I'd also be interested in looking at the data series for that graph. Based on what I can see, if you remove the primary outlier (heavily debt-laden Greece) there is hardly any correlation. Also, these are fiscal consolidation projections versus growth projections. These projections are based on the assumption that the multiplier is as large as you say it is, and that it will be the primary exogenous factor for future growth rates for these countries.. Not to say that these assumptions aren't true, but you are begging the question.

And yes, nations in a currency union are pretty different from the U.S. In fact, pretty much every nation is different from the U.S. Which is why it's puzzling to me that you are trying to use this report to prove a point, or that you think Brad DeLong's highly reductive comparison of the British and U.S. economies actually shows anything. The situation is far too nuanced to simply be able to draw the conclusion that stimulus=good, debt reduction=bad. And if you look down further in the report, there are some telling graphs that show growth rates begin to significantly tail off once a nation reaches a debt/GDP ratio of about 100-110%. Again, each situation is different. But based on what I've seen in the past four years, I see no reason to expect significant returns from any further transient fiscal stimulus or monetary accommodation.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top