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Anyone interested in doing a RJK Political Asylum Book Club?

NB: my cousin is really bright; I just find it very difficult to ask him anything and don't want to pry or bring up any unpleasantness, which strikes me as somewhat odd because it's not as though I don't have my own unspeakably unpleasant experiences and reactions to those events that he himself has an interest in. Nonetheless, the war is something we just don't talk about.
 
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Intel Wars by Mathew Aid

Haven't read it myself yet, but I heard a radio interview with the author and thought you all might be interesting reading Intel Wars.




"In Intel Wars, preeminent secrecy and intelligence historian Matthew Aid ("our reigning expert on the NSA"-Seymour M. Hersh) delivers the inside stories of how and why our shadow war against extremism has floundered. Spendthrift, schizophrenic policies leave next-generation spy networks drowning in raw data, resource-starved, and choked on paperwork. Overlapping jurisdictions stall CIA operatives, who wait seventy-two hours for clearance to attack fast-moving Taliban IE D teams. U.S. military computers-their classified hard drives still in place-turn up for sale at Afghan bazaars. Swift, tightly focused operations like the Bin Laden strike are the exception rather than the rule.



Intel Wars-based on extensive, on-the-ground interviews, and revelations from Wikileaks cables and other newly declassified documents-shows how our soldier-spies are still fighting to catch up with the enemy. Matthew Aid captures the lumbering behemoth that is the U.S. military-intelligence complex in one comprehensive narrative, and distills the unprecedented challenges to our security into a compelling- and sobering-read. "

Before Sept. 11, 2011, there were 16 intelligence agencies in the United States. But after the attacks, the 9/11 Commission recommended creating a 17th intelligence agency — the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) — to coordinate intelligence operations.

The 16 already existing agencies didn't react well, says historian and former intelligence analyst Matthew Aid.

"They hated the idea of a [so-called] 'intelligence czar,' " he tells Fresh Air's Dave Davies. "Each of the 16 intelligence agencies that existed before the creation of the ODNI [are] bureaucracies. They have a bureaucratic identity ... and they love their independence."

After much debate, the ODNI was created — but given almost no authority over the 100,000 or so spies who work for the Pentagon. The result? Essentially two separate spy networks within the intelligence community: the civilians who work for the 16 agencies reporting to the ODNI, and the 100,000 spies at the Pentagon who report to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence.

"They have separate budgets, they report to separate committees, and it is a structural nightmare," says Aid.

In his book Intel Wars, Aid details how overlapping jurisdictions, bureaucratic policies and a glut of data have crippled the intelligence community in its war against would-be terrorists.

"You talk to officials who used to work or work today at the ODNI, and there's just frustration," he says. "I quoted one official as saying, 'It would be nice if the boys over at the Pentagon let us know what they were up to,' which I think gives a hint that says things could be more tightly controlled than they are right now."

Drowning In Information

Before Sept. 11, Aid says, the U.S. had 200 drones collecting data all over the world. That number climbed to over 6,000 after the attacks. Many of these drones provide essential information for intelligence forces, says Aid, but there's a problem: Mixed in with the good stuff is also a lot of nonessential information. Aid says intelligence analysts are drowning in the data — particularly because there aren't enough analysts to sift through what's potentially important.

"I've interviewed a number of collectors who worked in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one of their complaints is, 'I'm sitting in a foxhole and I've got 3,000 emails coming in from Washington every morning with all the latest intelligence. And the guy said, 'It's wonderful that they're sharing this stuff with me; I just wish they were a little more selective about what they were sending me.' "

Each new unarmed drone designed by the U.S. sends back even more raw data to be processed.

"They're essential, but the problem is ... the amount of data is literally drowning the analyst on the order of something like 275 operators and analysts to analyze the result of each drone intelligence mission," says Aid.

And most of the drones in operation are controlled by the Pentagon, he says, so the ODNI has little control over which drones are purchased, or how the information is then analyzed.

"And just so you know, the people engaged in the drone program working within the military probably [number] about 40- [to] 45,000 people ... The CIA has about 25- [to] 30,000 people," he says. "There are more people working on the drone program than [in] the CIA."

Though the agencies are cooperating with each other to some degree, Aid says they're not working together as much as they should — and they're limited by what they can send out into the field.

"[For example] the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan not only controls all U.S. forces but he controls all NATO and Afghan forces, which means the U.S. intelligence community has to sanitize all of the intelligence [the commander] gets, because you don't know who's going to be reading the material," he says. "A lot of the most sensitive material collected by the U.S. intelligence community about al-Qaida ... is not cleared for dissemination to the [commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan]. There's a separate headquarters ... where all of that sensitive stuff goes."

Technological Challenges


Intelligence analysts are challenged not only by the glut of information coming to them through the unmanned drone program; Aid says that until recently, they also faced a more fundamental problem at the National Security Agency headquarters in Maryland: a shortage of electrical power.

"The NSA was spending billions of dollars on new collection systems and vast amounts of computer hardware and software, and jamming it into its headquarters, but did not build additional power stations to keep the systems up and running," he says. "So you had these embarrassing instances ... where if you plugged in a coffee pot, you literally could knock off the electricity for an entire wing at NSA headquarters."

The solution? Every office at NSA headquarters was assigned an "electricity monitor."

"If you wanted to install a new percolator coffee pot in your office, they had to measure the amps that the coffee pot generated and then write up a formal request to install the coffee pot in their office, and then go through 27 approvals before some higher-up official signed it," says Aid.
 
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I read this thread as "A RJK Political Asylum Book", thought you meant compile all the crazy shit that gets said (mostly by RJ) "Shit my dad says style"... seemed like a good idea, kinda disappointed it was actually such a practical thread
 
It's a well-written book. Sometimes it gets a little repetitive, especially regarding reiterations of the point that major depressive and bipolar disorders are very super important risk factors for suicide. There are other points where a topic seems to have been treated cursorily and I wish there had been more depth. I lost my dad when he shot himself a little over 1000 days ago. There are certainly parts that were tough to read, though Redfield Jamison focuses more on suicides in the adolesent-40 year old demographic.

I recommend it highly, but it's an in-depth look at suicide as a whole, and not any specific part of it. The essays, especially the one about Drew Sopirak, really pack a punch. I did not enjoy the final chapter, A half-stitched scar: those left behind as much as the rest of the book, but I might just be too close. Bereavement is painfully individual and often inexpressible and I think a scientific approach undersells some things. As to her statement that most survivors have little psychopathology resulting from their loss, I am not sure. I have PTSD-like symptoms (biggest thing differentiating my symptoms from PTSD, per my counselor, is that I never experience fear for my own life or well-being) and have always been told by clinicians that that is not at all uncommon. That's splitting hairs, though. It is an excellent and valuable book.
 
Intel Wars by Mathew Aid

Haven't read it myself yet, but I heard a radio interview with the author and thought you all might be interesting reading Intel Wars.




"In Intel Wars, preeminent secrecy and intelligence historian Matthew Aid ("our reigning expert on the NSA"-Seymour M. Hersh) delivers the inside stories of how and why our shadow war against extremism has floundered. Spendthrift, schizophrenic policies leave next-generation spy networks drowning in raw data, resource-starved, and choked on paperwork. Overlapping jurisdictions stall CIA operatives, who wait seventy-two hours for clearance to attack fast-moving Taliban IE D teams. U.S. military computers-their classified hard drives still in place-turn up for sale at Afghan bazaars. Swift, tightly focused operations like the Bin Laden strike are the exception rather than the rule.



Intel Wars-based on extensive, on-the-ground interviews, and revelations from Wikileaks cables and other newly declassified documents-shows how our soldier-spies are still fighting to catch up with the enemy. Matthew Aid captures the lumbering behemoth that is the U.S. military-intelligence complex in one comprehensive narrative, and distills the unprecedented challenges to our security into a compelling- and sobering-read. "

Before Sept. 11, 2011, there were 16 intelligence agencies in the United States. But after the attacks, the 9/11 Commission recommended creating a 17th intelligence agency — the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) — to coordinate intelligence operations.

The 16 already existing agencies didn't react well, says historian and former intelligence analyst Matthew Aid.

"They hated the idea of a [so-called] 'intelligence czar,' " he tells Fresh Air's Dave Davies. "Each of the 16 intelligence agencies that existed before the creation of the ODNI [are] bureaucracies. They have a bureaucratic identity ... and they love their independence."

After much debate, the ODNI was created — but given almost no authority over the 100,000 or so spies who work for the Pentagon. The result? Essentially two separate spy networks within the intelligence community: the civilians who work for the 16 agencies reporting to the ODNI, and the 100,000 spies at the Pentagon who report to the undersecretary of defense for intelligence.

"They have separate budgets, they report to separate committees, and it is a structural nightmare," says Aid.

In his book Intel Wars, Aid details how overlapping jurisdictions, bureaucratic policies and a glut of data have crippled the intelligence community in its war against would-be terrorists.

"You talk to officials who used to work or work today at the ODNI, and there's just frustration," he says. "I quoted one official as saying, 'It would be nice if the boys over at the Pentagon let us know what they were up to,' which I think gives a hint that says things could be more tightly controlled than they are right now."

Drowning In Information

Before Sept. 11, Aid says, the U.S. had 200 drones collecting data all over the world. That number climbed to over 6,000 after the attacks. Many of these drones provide essential information for intelligence forces, says Aid, but there's a problem: Mixed in with the good stuff is also a lot of nonessential information. Aid says intelligence analysts are drowning in the data — particularly because there aren't enough analysts to sift through what's potentially important.

"I've interviewed a number of collectors who worked in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one of their complaints is, 'I'm sitting in a foxhole and I've got 3,000 emails coming in from Washington every morning with all the latest intelligence. And the guy said, 'It's wonderful that they're sharing this stuff with me; I just wish they were a little more selective about what they were sending me.' "

Each new unarmed drone designed by the U.S. sends back even more raw data to be processed.

"They're essential, but the problem is ... the amount of data is literally drowning the analyst on the order of something like 275 operators and analysts to analyze the result of each drone intelligence mission," says Aid.

And most of the drones in operation are controlled by the Pentagon, he says, so the ODNI has little control over which drones are purchased, or how the information is then analyzed.

"And just so you know, the people engaged in the drone program working within the military probably [number] about 40- [to] 45,000 people ... The CIA has about 25- [to] 30,000 people," he says. "There are more people working on the drone program than [in] the CIA."

Though the agencies are cooperating with each other to some degree, Aid says they're not working together as much as they should — and they're limited by what they can send out into the field.

"[For example] the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan not only controls all U.S. forces but he controls all NATO and Afghan forces, which means the U.S. intelligence community has to sanitize all of the intelligence [the commander] gets, because you don't know who's going to be reading the material," he says. "A lot of the most sensitive material collected by the U.S. intelligence community about al-Qaida ... is not cleared for dissemination to the [commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan]. There's a separate headquarters ... where all of that sensitive stuff goes."

Technological Challenges


Intelligence analysts are challenged not only by the glut of information coming to them through the unmanned drone program; Aid says that until recently, they also faced a more fundamental problem at the National Security Agency headquarters in Maryland: a shortage of electrical power.

"The NSA was spending billions of dollars on new collection systems and vast amounts of computer hardware and software, and jamming it into its headquarters, but did not build additional power stations to keep the systems up and running," he says. "So you had these embarrassing instances ... where if you plugged in a coffee pot, you literally could knock off the electricity for an entire wing at NSA headquarters."

The solution? Every office at NSA headquarters was assigned an "electricity monitor."

"If you wanted to install a new percolator coffee pot in your office, they had to measure the amps that the coffee pot generated and then write up a formal request to install the coffee pot in their office, and then go through 27 approvals before some higher-up official signed it," says Aid.

Read this, by the way. God are we awful at intel.
 
I think this would be a good idea but only if a lot of people, with varying opinions would participate.

I picked up Juan Williams' "Muzzled" from Boarders during their fire sale a few months ago. I am just now getting around to reading it and I thought it would be cool to get others feedback on it.

Just a thought.

Is there a chapter in his book called "I'm the biggest tool in Washington"?
 
The Great Transformation, by Karl Polanyi, is the book everyone should read, or at least read Dissent on it here

The move to markets is inherently destabilizing. Rather than a font of liberty and freedom, markets are also a source of coercion, instability, precarity, and worse. Subjecting all of life to the market wouldn’t result in the freest society but instead one defined by the collapse of social life.
 
I likely won't have time to participate but I highly recommend "In the Garden of Beasts" by Erik Larson (same guy who wrote Devil in the White City). I'm about a third of the way through and can't put it down. It's historical non-fiction and tells the story of the US ambassador to Germany's experience in Berlin during the rise of Hitler in the early to mid 1930's. Crazy stuff and unfortunately some parts hit a little too close to home for comfort right now...and I don't say that lightly.

https://www.amazon.com/Garden-Beasts-Terror-American-Hitlers/dp/030740885X

Amazon Best Books of the Month, May 2011: In the Garden of Beasts is a vivid portrait of Berlin during the first years of Hitler’s reign, brought to life through the stories of two people: William E. Dodd, who in 1933 became America’s first ambassador to Hitler’s regime, and his scandalously carefree daughter, Martha. Ambassador Dodd, an unassuming and scholarly man, is an odd fit among the extravagance of the Nazi elite. His frugality annoys his fellow Americans in the State Department and Dodd’s growing misgivings about Hitler’s ambitions fall on deaf ears among his peers, who are content to “give Hitler everything he wants.” Martha, on the other hand, is mesmerized by the glamorous parties and the high-minded conversation of Berlin’s salon society—and flings herself headlong into numerous affairs with the city’s elite, most notably the head of the Gestapo and a Soviet spy. Both become players in the exhilarating (and terrifying) story of Hitler’s obsession for absolute power, which culminates in the events of one murderous night, later known as “the Night of Long Knives.” The rise of Nazi Germany is a well-chronicled time in history, which makes In the Garden of Beasts all the more remarkable. Erik Larson has crafted a gripping, deeply-intimate narrative with a climax that reads like the best political thriller, where we are stunned with each turn of the page, even though we already know the outcome. --Shane Hansanuwat --This text refers to the Audio CD edition.
 
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