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Conference Expansion: Stanford, California and SMU Join the ACC

The more that I read about the issues of antitrust, revenue sharing, NIL, etc. in college sports, the more I agree with those who say that collective bargaining between athletes and the college sports industry "owners" (schools and conferences) will be necessary to settle the issues and provide stability to the industry.

As I mentioned before, athletes.org is one of the organizations that is maneuvering to provide representation to athletes in any future deals between them and the industry owners. Another such organization is the College Football Players Association (CFBPA), led by Jason Stahl, a former prof at the University of Minnesota.

Stahl is lobbying Congress to get it to pass legislation that would allow college athletes to bargain collectively with schools and conferences without the need for the athletes to be classified as employees.

It's an interesting idea, but anything that requires support from Congress is going to be challenging to implement anytime soon.


...We at the College Football Players Association (CFBPA) believe that current players should be able to choose to fight the battle for formal employment and collective bargaining if that is the battle they want to fight—as was the case with the Dartmouth men’s basketball players. But increasingly, as we talk with current athletes on multiple football programs around the country, there does not seem to be an appetite for these types of legal battles over formal employment, unionization and collective bargaining.

As such, at the CFBPA we have begun thinking about what a new model of collective bargaining might look like—a hybrid option that stops short of full employee classification for college athletes but that gives athletes numerous protections and the ability to collectively bargain with schools and/or conferences.

Legal scholars have explored just such an option and argue that a “special status” can be created for collective bargaining purposes in unique circumstances. Although a bit outdated given its publication in 2012, Michael H. LeRoy’s “An Invisible Union for An Invisible Labor Market” is still the best at fleshing out “a unique hybrid form of collective bargaining that draws from elements in the NLRA and state collective bargaining laws” that would be uniquely appropriate for college athletics. We would update LeRoy’s article to include collective bargaining rights beyond those he outlines, but we at the CFBPA believe that this is just the type of legislative action worth exploring.

Some college sports administrators are even starting to see the benefit of such a pathway. Just this past October, outgoing Notre Dame Athletic Director Jack Swarbrick specifically advocated for this type of solution. He argued, and other leaders in college sports seem to agree, that there must be a mechanism to bargain with athletes over a great many issues like compensation, benefits, hours, etc. He said that the concept would “mirror” a collective bargaining system seen in professional sports, but “without stripping student-athletes of their student status” and making them employees. Swarbrick correctly recognized what many administrators now do: that if you want to create a more sustainable future for college athletics, you need to negotiate with the players collectively to do so.

To get this type of “special status” for college athletes, one which stops short of employee status but gives extensive protections and collective bargaining rights, you would need Congress to enact new legislation. We at the CFBPA now believe that such legislation is worth exploring—particularly after current ongoing antitrust cases against the NCAA, the conferences and the schools are settled in a way that is fair for athletes.

Over the next several weeks, I and our Board of Directors will begin reaching out to industry stakeholders who may be interested in such a legislative pathway forward. We encourage those individuals to reach out to us as well. Additionally, we will be on Capitol Hill this coming week to take meetings with U.S. Senators and Representatives from both parties in order to discuss whether they might have interest in enacting the type of legislation I’m discussing here. Preliminary conversations suggest there might be.

Increasingly in the United States, Americans are engaged in work arrangements which don’t fit the traditional employer/employee model. From so-called “gig workers” driving for Uber to independent contractors building their own small businesses, many Americans have chosen new types of work lives. Within these new types of work lives, workers have nevertheless found new ways to collectively organize themselves. Sometimes, that has meant seeking recognition as formal employees. More often than not, though, it has meant seeking to keep their independent status while working to collectively better their working conditions in other ways.

This hybrid model makes sense for organizing college athletes. These Americans increasingly already think of themselves as independent brands/businesses as opposed to formal employees of anyone. Additionally, as Professor LeRoy has argued, “college athletics is so unique that there are good reasons for a carve-out” for a new type of collective bargaining. We agree and want to work with anyone who is interested in helping us build legislation which will do just that.
 
According to what Dellenger suggests, schools could be free to give as many scholarships as they want up to whatever number is set as the new roster limits, though the roster limits for most sports would probably decrease. The idea behind such a change would be that the new scholarship dollars would count as part of the "revenue sharing" under an antitrust settlement.

B1G and SEC schools would be OK with such a change, since they can afford to spend lavishly on football and all the other sports too. But such a change is not so good for a school like Wake, because it has no obvious source of new money to spend on doubling the number of scholarships for baseball and soccer.

Also, there's the small mater of Title IX--as soon as you start providing more scholarships for men, you have to do the same for women. Where does the money come from? AD Currie hopes to raise $100M for women's teams, but that will be a much bigger challenge than raising money for football and basketball practice palaces.
Right now at least NIL monies are helping private schools like Wake even up the public/private tuition discrepancy parents have to make up on the partials those athletes get. It can at least “seem” like we have about 20 baseball and don’t know how much extra money soccer has coming in.
I would think it will be a huge grind for AD Currie to raise $100 mill for women just based on how little basketball is getting now. But who knows?
 
Here's the latest on proposed models and amounts of revenue sharing with athletes from Ross Dellenger of Yahoo Sports:


...The next 12 to 18 months of major college athletics stands to be its most transformative in history — a consequential and long-expected step toward professionalism for the power schools.

The evolving revenue-sharing concept is a central piece in what could be a 10-year settlement agreement of three cases (House/Hubbard/Carter) featuring as much as $2.9 billion in back-paid damages as well as a direct athlete-compensation model that also expands NCAA scholarship limits.

Athletic administrators are grappling with a cost of $25-30 million annually per school as reported in a wide-ranging story last week at Yahoo Sports. While the revenue-sharing concept as well as the expansion of scholarships is permissive — schools are not required to do either — universities limiting their athlete distribution risk falling further behind in a competitive industry where talent acquisition is rooted in recruiting.

Administrators, university boards and presidential councils are mobilizing with plans to reduce expenses; add operating staff to negotiate athlete contracts; bring collective personnel under their umbrella; and even mine untapped revenue streams such as private equity or booster loans.

It’s a mad dash to a finish line: Conference commissioners are working to gain consensus to authorize a settlement agreement from their presidential boards, preferably within the month. The earliest implementation of the new model is believed to be fall of 2025.

But if an agreement is finalized before a model is implemented, what happens?

Cavale refers to this 14- to 16-month stretch as an “interim period” where collective bargaining with current athletes should occur. He uses a sports analogy to describe the situation. Current negotiations represent pregame warmups. A finalized settlement is the kickoff. The interim period is the first quarter, where the groundwork is laid for the rest of the proverbial game.

“The thing we all have to understand is that when this settlement is initiated, it doesn’t mean the next day that everyone is getting paid,” said Cavale, whose organization has more than 1,300 power conference football and basketball players as members. “It’s very important that all of the terms of this settlement are being negotiated between the athletes and their schools and conferences. This settlement is not relevant to the guys now making six to seven figures with a free apartment and a Land Rover. But when it is initiated, it becomes relevant.”

...But what about in this new model?

A revenue-sharing model may come with more structure and regulation: binding player contracts, a limitation of third-party/collective payments and, for some football and basketball players, a reduction in their NIL-related salaries to possibly satisfy Title IX — the federal law requiring universities to provide equal opportunity for women as for men.

Stahl’s organization recently announced its support for a collective bargaining model without employment — something former Notre Dame athletic director Jack Swarbrick and others within the industry believe to be a solution. Cavale himself has spoken publicly in the past for a non-employment bargaining model.

However, for such a concept, a congressional carve-out for athletes is necessary — a high hurdle during an election year but potentially something more palatable next Congress.

For now, questions linger. In whatever new model, will universities share enough with football and basketball players? How exactly is the rev-share cap determined? And how much will the cap change?

Yahoo Sports analyzed reported financial figures of the 55 power conference public schools whose data was acquired by both the Knight Commission and Sportico.

Determining what’s fair — and not fair — is a complicated and subjective endeavor. Athletic department finances are complex, and financial information is almost exclusively derived from a school’s own reporting — figures that can be one-sided or even misreported.

As part of the evolving settlement negotiations, the cap is determined as 22% of a formula of power conference school revenue streams that are “commercially generated,” said one stakeholder. The most significant of these streams are (1) television contracts, (2) ticket sales, (3) sponsorship/licensing and (4) gameday sales, as well as other less significant buckets.

Last year, among power conference public athletic departments, those streams generated $4.7 billion in revenue, or $85.2 million per school. Twenty-two percent is $1.03 billion, or $19 million per school presumably earmarked for athlete revenue sharing.

These numbers are unlikely to perfectly match with a new model’s final figures. But the results at least give outsiders an idea of the financials. The figures are sure to change. College football, responsible for a majority of the revenue figures, is in the midst one of its most profitable and popular eras in history, eclipsing in regular viewership most professional sports outside of the NFL.

The aforementioned revenue categories are expected to rise, predominantly from television contracts. By 2026, for instance, projections show SEC and Big Ten schools receiving as much as $25 million in additional revenue each year from both their new television deals as well as an increase in College Football Playoff distribution.

According to those briefed on the revenue-share concept, a look-in provision — potentially triggered every third year — will result in a reevaluation of the cap to reflect these soaring numbers.

But there is more to this story. There are items exempt from the formula, such as donations.

Donor gifts have traditionally generated more revenue than any other stream within a major college athletic department. In an analysis of the public school financial figures, donations account for $2.04 billion, eclipsing revenue streams from television deals ($1.89B), ticket sales ($1.48B), sponsorships and licensing ($833M) and gameday sales ($206M).

The settlement-related revenue-share concept is expected to feature more exemptions as well. Alston-related payments to athletes may count toward a school’s revenue share amount. Schools providing the full Alston payment to each athlete (roughly $6,000) normally spend $1.5-$3 million annually.

In another possible exemption, schools that choose to expand on scholarships can count a portion of the additional scholarship expense toward the revenue-sharing figure as well, though it’s unclear exactly how much.

Scholarship expenses are a heavy load for athletic departments and one that many administrators point to as an expense that gets overlooked. Power conferences spent about $845 million last year on academic financial aid, or about $15.4 million per school.

That does not include an array of other expenditures geared toward athletes, such as dining (average of $5 million annually), equipment ($4 million) and medical expenses ($2 million). That doesn’t include additional staff members hired for athlete-only purposes (academic tutors, mental health specialists, etc.) and the illustrious, newly built facilities often used as recruiting tools.

Several power conference school administrators have said publicly that they spend at least $150,000 annually per athlete. One of those is Alabama athletic director Greg Byrne, who, in previous interviews, puts the figure at $187,000 when factoring academic, athletic and medical resources for an athlete.

So is it all enough?

Combine the average expense on scholarships ($15.4 million) with those athlete-only resources ($10 million) and, finally, a revenue-share figure of $20 million. That’s $45 million worth of athlete benefits — a figure that rivals the 50% mark of a power conference school’s commercially generated revenue.

Will it be enough?

“It’s difficult to look at a settlement as a tool for a complete model,” Huma said. “You look at how something can be settled in this environment — there are a lot of different pieces. I just don’t have faith that the NCAA and schools will come up with a model that is practical. Any model will be nibbling around the edges.”

_________________

This chart showing sports revenue for Power 4 public universities accompanies the article. Wake's sports revenue (TV, tickets, ACC $) is probably about $40-50M.

Revenue.jpg
 
An article in the athletic.com from today summarizes the progress towards a settlement in the House case and some possible implications.

Many things remain unclear, including the first point in this excerpt, i.e. that schools would be allowed to share as much as $20M per year with athletes but that they would not necessarily be required to share that much.

Hmm...how would that work for a conference like the ACC that has significantly lower revenue than the BIG 2 and a school like WF that has lower revenue than its bigger conference rivals?

It doesn't sound good, because under current rules the costs of running a sports program are capped at a certain level by NCAA limits even though revenues are not capped.

Of course, AD Currie has promised Deacon fans that Wake would always compete at the "highest level" of intercollegiate athletics, so there should be no cause for concern. But where will the extra $20M per year come from?


...That cut could total around $20 million per year for all of a school’s athletes — football, basketball, non-revenue sports, men’s and women’s teams — according to those briefed on the talks. Schools would participate in revenue sharing on an opt-in basis, so some could choose to pay less than the proposed maximum, half of it or none of it.

This does not solve the problems (assuming they are problems) with the transfer portal, NIL and pay-for-play. But in the eyes of administrators, it’s a key step, as revenue sharing would have a domino effect on NIL and perhaps the portal: Schools directly paying athletes can alleviate donor fatigue. There could be ways to use revenue sharing to convince players not to transfer. And the willingness to even turn to revenue sharing could be a step toward actually getting help from the government.

...Power-conference commissioners have been willing to engage, and not just the most powerful two, per multiple sources within the industry: The Big Ten and SEC may be the two richest conferences, but they haven’t been the sole driving force toward a settlement. College presidents generally were the most reluctant, but during the past year there has been, as one official put it, “an evolution in thinking.”

The overall chaos was a driving factor, but recent events have built toward a tipping point:

• The transfer portal, which got as wild as it has ever been during this college football offseason, with key players jumping and splashy reports of the money involved in those decisions.

• A West Virginia court injunction that threw out the NCAA’s rule restricting athletes to a one-time free transfer, allowing players to leave after any year and not sit out any seasons.

• The NCAA’s investigation of Tennessee football about quarterback Nico Iamaleava’s recruitment, which was countered by the Tennessee attorney general’s successful pursuit of a temporary restraining order preventing the NCAA from enforcing its own recruiting rules.

This last blow to the status quo in particular helped mobilize a lot of people, according to another official.

Again, to be clear, not everyone is there yet. The House case could still go to court in December. Negotiations could still break down over details. There remains concern about the problems a settlement may not entirely solve, from how a new system would fit within Title IX to whether placing a cap on revenue sharing leaves it open for antitrust challenges.

But the momentum is now on the side of a settlement. As one official put it, some people want to solve everything at once, while others say officials need to get what they can get done and go from there. And that’s where things appear to be heading in the next few weeks.

Whether it means going to the drastic step of calling athletes employees, a step that may be necessary to regain control of transfers and other rules, remains a big debate. But the ground has moved enough that many are speaking about employment, or at least a collective bargaining agreement, in more than just hushed tones.
 
Will the schools be limited to just using money generated by athletics, or will they be able to use other funds?
 
Will the schools be limited to just using money generated by athletics, or will they be able to use other funds?
I would hope most boards of trustees/governors/regents wouldn’t be so stupid as to dip into university funds for athletics.
 
Cut teacher pay, especially TA’s.

Raise student fees.

Put the endowment to work.
 
Will the schools be limited to just using money generated by athletics, or will they be able to use other funds?
There is no such rule now and there's no reason to think that there would be any such rule in the future.

In fact, many schools outside the BIG 2 that want to compete with the Big Boys will need to use money from sources other than sports to pay for their athletic departments. Some schools outside the Power 4 already charge all students an annual sports fee (as much as $500) that goes straight to the athletic department of those schools. In general, Wake doesn't charge student fees in addition to its tuition (which is high enough!).

I don't think we really know whether the Wake currently dips into general funds to support its sports programs. It's impossible to say for sure because of Wake's private status and because its financial reports are not detailed enough. However, if Wake fully embraces revenue sharing in the future then it might need to come up with millions (10M-20M?) of new dollars to support sports.
 
One of the big unanswered questions about any settlement of the House antitrust case involves Title IX-- specifically how would it affect any future model of revenue sharing with athletes?


As settlement talks ramp up in the blockbuster House v. NCAA antitrust case, one of the most significant unanswered questions is how a revenue-sharing model will operate within the parameters of Title IX.

The 52-year-old federal law that protects students from sex-based discrimination at any school that receives federal funding stipulates schools must provide male and female student-athletes with equal treatment and benefits.

What will that mean in a new world in which schools can potentially share upwards of $20 million with athletes? Even among legal minds, there is no consensus.

“There is not a clear answer on whether Title IX applies to market-based payments to college athletes, whether those payments are for NIL rights or athletic performance,” Mit Winter, a college sports attorney with Kennyhertz Perry and board member for the players’ association Athletes.org, told On3. “You’ll get different answers depending on who you talk to, and there are legal analyses going both ways.”

Bay Area-based Arthur Bryant of Bailey & Glasser, LLP – who has represented more women athletes in Title IX litigation against schools and universities than any lawyer nationwide – said that institutions, conferences and the NCAA need to be aware that whatever revenue-sharing model is implemented, Title IX requires that female and male student-athletes receive equal treatment and benefits.

Under Title IX, Bryant told On3, when it comes to “straight-out payments” – like scholarship dollars – “equal” means proportional.

“If 60% of the student-athletes are women and Title IX applies, they basically need to receive 60% of the revenue-sharing dollars shared,” said Bryant, who is currently representing current and former Oregon athletes in a class-action Title IX lawsuit.

Bryant added if a revenue-sharing model does not provide equal treatment and benefits, “they will be held accountable.”

Will gender disparities grow even wider?

Just Thursday, the U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report that underscored how schools nationwide routinely violate Title IX compliance.

The report showed that, during the 2021-22 academic year, women accounted for 56% of the undergraduate population but just 42% of the student-athlete population. Institutions that receive federal funding are required to offer athletic participation opportunities for men and women that are proportionate to their enrollment numbers.

In addition, the report showed that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights rarely opens Title IX investigations of schools on its own and that there are long delays in the OCR’s communication with schools that are being monitored following investigations.

Julie Sommer, executive director of The Drake Group Education Fund, is concerned about schools maintaining Title IX compliance in a revenue-sharing ecosystem because she says there’s already an absence of an equal playing field. Cash for education [scholarships] and cash for NIL is financial aid, she said, and the use of revenues that must equally benefit male and female athletes.

“We know most institutions are already not in compliance with Title IX in opportunities, scholarships and spending,” Sommer told On3. “It’s easy to see how the additional funding and support available to college athletes – which is a good thing – could make those disparities grow even wider with revenue sharing. Creating wider disparities isn’t the direction we should be going in college sports when we’re trying to make it more equitable.”

Schools will need to share an equal amount of dollars with female and male athletes to remain Title IX compliant, she said. For instance, if a so-called cap is $20 million, will $10 million need to be shared with female athletes?

Will schools fulfill Title IX requirements?

Sommer said the Title IX proportionality requirement is female athletic participation opportunities equal to the percent of full-time undergraduates in the student body, which must be achieved first if the institution is not in compliance. Then, financial aid is distributed in proportion to the percentage of male and female athletes. This obligation is always males in the aggregate and females in the aggregate – never a sport-to-sport comparison, she added.

“When you introduce this level of revenue into the equation, it’s clear institutions could run into new problems with legal compliance,” Sommer said.

In Winter’s view, if Title IX factors for college athletics are strictly applied to market-based payments, Title IX does not apply to those payments. But there won’t be a firm answer until the U.S. Department of Education weighs in or the issue is litigated.

Also of note: Among Title IX’s many factors is publicity, which requires schools to promote their men’s and women’s athletics teams equally. But that promotional activity can be the same even if it costs more for, say, the football team.

The same types of marketing materials featuring athlete NILs can be created for all teams, but the cost of those materials for football and basketball will often be higher because it costs more to acquire the rights to use those athletes’ NILs in those materials.

“I don’t think that presents a Title IX issue,” Winter said.

NIL collectives won’t go away

Overall, expect many schools to proceed as if Title IX does apply to direct payments they make to athletes, Winter said, unless or until the DOE or a court says otherwise.

In that proceed-with-caution scenario, with roughly an equal amount of NIL dollars going to male and female athletes at a school, you’ll likely see money going to male athletes concentrated in football and basketball. That means athletes in other sports may receive only a small amount of NIL compensation, if any, from their schools.

As several industry sources told On3, this is why many donor-funded collectives are likely to stick around – to add compensation on top of what schools are providing. That’s because Title IX might act as a limit to what schools can give to football and basketball athletes, as well as those in other sports.

“Relatedly, some schools will still likely make NIL payments through third parties,” Winter said. “Not only because they don’t want to try and replicate everything that collectives or other third-party entities do. But because they view it as providing some insulation from Title IX [because the third party is outside the school’s umbrella] and providing other liability protections.”
 
To offer a brief break to Capt. Renault's posts warning of imminent Armageddon (appreciate his effort to educate, but at some point, it's just white noise - if WF stops playing games, it will suck a lot, but life will go on), here is the latest realignment news about a school actually changing conferences:

 
Then why are they adding Seattle?
 
To take a break from exciting CUSA and WCC conference expansion news, let's review some ACC history, thanks to Andrew Carter of the Charlotte Observer. Specifically, how did the storybook marriage between FSU and the ACC go so wrong? Well, to paraphase Ernest Hemingway, "gradually then suddenly."


Long before the looming divorce between Florida State and the ACC, decades before the bitter legal filings and the dueling lawsuits playing out in courtrooms in North Carolina and Florida, there was something almost like romance. Not love, exactly. But mutual attraction, and the shared lust for the one thing that always drives these kinds of relationships, then like now. They both thought they could make each other a lot of money. They were right, it turned out, though here’s the thing about relationships built on such a materialistic foundation: they only work in the good times, when the money flows just right and when the neighbor’s house and car aren’t as desirable; when, indeed, the grass isn’t greener anywhere else.

When that starts to change everything else does, too, which is now why FSU has hired an army of lawyers to attack the ACC’s Grant of Rights, and why the ACC has done the same to defend itself. Who knew, decades ago, that the greatest drama between FSU and the ACC wouldn’t come between the lines but in court, in cases that might well decide the future of major college sports? Well, it wasn’t always this way. There were good years. Happy years. Rich years. Many seasons that ended with trophies and jubilant celebrations. Many fiscal years that ended with large checks. The story of the relationship between Florida State and the ACC is, in many ways, the story of American college sports. It is a story of contrasting missions and the endless pursuit of revenue. It is a story of the conflict between traditionalism and what university presidents wanted college sports to be, against what they’ve always been in reality.

It’s a story of the relentless chase of more. And how, ultimately, more is never enough. It’s a story best told from the very beginning. A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE The courtship began with public rumblings of private flirtations, a conference and a school coming together to explore how they might fill each other’s needs. That’s how it started between the ACC and Florida State in the late spring and early summer months of 1990, a simpler time in college athletics and everywhere else, too.

It was a time when the Big Ten actually consisted of 10 schools. When conferences really did represent their geographic namesakes. When college basketball’s regular season commanded as much television money as football, if not more. It was a time when the Metro Conference still existed. And the Southwest Conference, too. And a time when one league’s men’s basketball tournament was considered so valuable, so sacred, that its leaders wondered whether expansion might ruin it. Indeed, that was among the ACC’s chief concerns, at the time, about inviting Florida State: That ACC Tournament tickets, then among the most coveted in American sports, would have to be divided nine ways instead of eight.

Those who might’ve been reluctant about such a thing had to get over it. Change had arrived. Notre Dame in early 1990 signed its own TV deal with NBC. The Big Ten in June of that year announced the addition of Penn State, which joined the league in 1993. The SEC in August of 1990 invited Arkansas, and then, months later, approved the addition of South Carolina, too. The ACC had a choice to make. It wasn’t necessarily an easy or obvious one, though perhaps it should have been. Florida State was burgeoning national football power, an independent in that sport and a member of the Metro Conference in others. The ACC was an eight-school league with a confined geographic footprint that stretched from Maryland to Georgia. The conference fancied itself as something of an ideal, an example of major college athletics as they were intended; a blend of athletic prowess and schools with a like-minded approach to academics.

The ACC was also the nation’s wealthiest conference, on a per-school distribution basis. It was seen as an innovator and a leader. Its men’s basketball TV rights were arguably the most valuable commodity in college athletics. The league’s weakness, though, was clear: football. Seven years before he became the commissioner of the ACC, John Swofford, then the athletics director at North Carolina, spoke in June of 1990 about the changes that were to come — “much of it driven by the television marketplace, particularly football television.” He spoke of the ACC’s need, as he put it at the time, “to have some vision.” “The worst thing would be if five years from now, we looked back at this period and felt like we didn’t have the vision or courage to take a step maybe we should have taken.”

The ACC approved its invitation to Florida State on Sept. 14, 1990. There was a press conference in Tallahassee the next day, a Saturday, before the Seminoles’ football game against Georgia Southern. Reporters and boosters and university administrators crowded into the atrium at the Moore Athletic Center. Bernie Sliger, the FSU President, stood behind the microphone. “It is with great pleasure I accept on behalf of Florida State University your invitation to become a member of the Atlantic Coast Conference,” he said. “I accept your acceptance,” said Gene Corrigan, the ACC Commissioner.

A 30-second ovation followed, one of four extended breaks for applause that day. In the newspapers the next morning, there were headlines about a wedding, metaphors about marriage between FSU and the ACC. It’d been a happy, hope-filled day. And now, 34 years later, they are headed toward divorce. The ACC has sued FSU. FSU has sued the ACC. Their relationship appears unsalvageable. The ACC’s annual spring meetings begin next week on Amelia Island, Florida, and the three-day event, which usually plays out amid an air of lightness at a beachside resort, will undoubtedly come with a sense of the awkward and weird. A family is breaking up. It will be something like a forced vacation during a separation, while lawyers work to figure out the terms of the split. No one can be sure when the divorce will be finalized. The only certainty, it seems, is that it’s coming. A marriage that was so lauded upon its beginning 34 years ago is falling apart. A relationship that was mutually beneficial, for so long, is all but over. And how did it reach this point for Florida State and the ACC? Perhaps theirs was a union destined to fail from the start.

WHEN ACC BASKETBALL MONEY RULED

Florida State had a choice to make, too, and over the years its decision to join the ACC has become one of those great hypothetical college sports what-ifs. What if it’d gone in a different direction? What if, instead, it’d joined the SEC? The option existed for a while. Before it settled on Arkansas, the SEC attempted to woo FSU. At that celebratory press conference in September 1990, Sliger said he “agonized” over the decision “more than any other” he’d ever made. Yet it actually wasn’t much of a decision at all. Not when he or anyone else looked at the numbers. “In general, the data amassed indicated the Atlantic Coast Conference would be the most appropriate choice for Florida State,” Sliger, who died in 2007, said at the time.

Translation: FSU stood to make more money in the ACC. And maybe a lot more money. Leaders on both sides offered a certain amount of spin to downplay the pursuit of revenue. At Florida State, they talked about the academic benefit-by-association of joining a conference with the likes of Duke and Virginia and UNC. In the ACC, which only narrowly produced the votes needed to pursue expansion — Duke and Maryland voted against — they talked about strength in numbers. Paul Hardin, then the chancellor at UNC, argued that adding FSU would help the conference preserve its “values.” Among those values, according to Hardin:

“(A)rdent, active pursuit of reform designed to enhance academic quality,” in athletics, he said upon the conference’s decision to add FSU, and “to reduce pressures on student-athletes and to reduce cost of athletics.” Thirty-four years later, Hardin’s commentary appears especially naive, if not downright laughable. Florida State’s arrival in the ACC led to no significant reform throughout college athletics, nor in the ACC. Pressures on athletes did not decrease. Costs related to athletics did not decrease. Major college sports only continued to become bigger and bigger business. Same then as now. Same as it has always been. Which was always what the marriage between the ACC and FSU was about, anyway — two entities getting together not for the pursuit of reform but for money. Bill McGrotha, whose name is on the press box at Florida State’s Doak Campbell Stadium, cut through the euphemisms and the PR-oriented messaging in his column in the Tallahassee Democrat the morning after the ACC voted to invite FSU...
 
Part 2: https://www.charlotteobserver.com/sports/college/article288417309.html

Wrote McGrotha, a little more than two years before his death in 1993: “Florida State did its homework, and what seemed pretty clear from the outset was that membership in the ACC would mean at least $1 million more per year — and that in a league that relies primarily on basketball for its income.”


That was a lot of money in a time when major conferences were just beginning to distribute to their member schools annual payouts in the seven figures. By 1990, the ACC’s eight schools were receiving about $2.5 million each from the league, much of it coming from basketball television revenue. ACC basketball at the time carried an enviable kind of gravitas. It was the conference of David Thompson and Michael Jordan and Len Bias; of those impassioned rivalries along Tobacco Road; of two national championships in the 1980s and the emergence of a national power at Duke. ACC basketball was valuable, a coveted TV commodity, and in those days it was everywhere, the only college sports property on Raycom, CBS, ABC and ESPN. And perhaps best of all for the ACC, there was no sign that would ever change. College basketball was as popular as ever. The NCAA Tournament, which expanded to 64 teams in 1985, was becoming more and more of a gold mine. The college game was rife with stars and storylines and captivating coaches, from Dean Smith to Bobby Knight to the cast of characters in the Big East.


Indeed, “as we head into the 1990s,” wrote Irwin Smallwood in the Greensboro News and Record, “no one can deny that college basketball is as much a part of the TV entertainment world as ‘Designing Women,’ ‘Newhart’ and ‘L.A. Law.’” Florida State wanted in on the ACC’s basketball TV revenue. It soon seemed like an especially prescient decision. In the spring of 1991, the ACC agreed to a six-year extension with Raycom and Jefferson Pilot worth $80 million. The deal, for the broadcast rights only to ACC men’s basketball games, became the envy of other leagues. Swofford, then in charge of the conference’s television committee, spoke with a sense of satisfaction at the ACC’s spring meetings in 1991. “This conference prides itself on being a step ahead of others in television matters,” he said.


Florida State hadn’t yet begun ACC competition. That came during the 1991-92 season in basketball, and in ‘92 in football. Even so, the conference’s new TV deal in the spring of ‘91 allowed FSU to approve an athletics department budget of almost $16 million, its largest to date. For the first time, FSU projected a surplus. “The conference affiliation really secures the future of Florida State athletics,” Bob Goin, the FSU athletics director, said at the time. “That’s what it should do. I can’t say enough about it.” And that’s how the marriage went, for a while. With something like a state of bliss — if not emotionally then at least financially.

FOOTBALL’S GROWTH CHANGED EVERYTHING


It has become fair to wonder whether the ACC was always going to be doomed, given how the economics of major college sports have evolved. There’s a sound argument to be made that can be summarized quickly: The television value of college basketball plummeted, and particularly that of the sport’s regular season. The opposite, meanwhile, happened in football. And in a college sports world whose riches are determined by football TV ratings, what hope did the ACC ever have? Demographically, after all, the conference cannot compete with the Big Ten and SEC. Those leagues are made up almost entirely of large state schools with deep alumni bases. In the ACC, meanwhile, five of the league’s 14 full-time members are private, smaller schools. Even some of the conference’s flagship public schools, like UNC and Virginia, are relatively small, and known for their less-than-passionate football followings. The analysis could be that simple: If football TV money was going to become the dominant factor in a conference’s bottom line — and it has — then perhaps the ACC never had a chance to compete with the Big Ten and SEC.


Such a conclusion, though, belies the reality that the ACC had a window. A narrow one, perhaps, but a window, nonetheless. During the 2005-06 fiscal year, the ACC was the nation’s richest conference. It generated $20 million more than the Big Ten and $10 million more than the SEC. The ACC distributed an average of almost $11 million to its members. The league had just expanded again, targeting a combination of TV markets and football achievement and potential. The addition of Miami, a national football power throughout the 1980s and 90s and into the early 2000s, was seen as a major coup. Virginia Tech, another new arrival, had emerged as a consistent national contender in football.


Such a conclusion, though, belies the reality that the ACC had a window. A narrow one, perhaps, but a window, nonetheless. During the 2005-06 fiscal year, the ACC was the nation’s richest conference. It generated $20 million more than the Big Ten and $10 million more than the SEC. The ACC distributed an average of almost $11 million to its members. The league had just expanded again, targeting a combination of TV markets and football achievement and potential. The addition of Miami, a national football power throughout the 1980s and 90s and into the early 2000s, was seen as a major coup. Virginia Tech, another new arrival, had emerged as a consistent national contender in football.


And if nothing else, the addition of Boston College gave the ACC a presence in a major northeast media market. There was not only reason for optimism, but elation. During the ACC’s spring meetings in 2006, conference officials and school administrators attended a glowing presentation from Dave Brown, who was in charge of ESPN and ABC’s college football broadcasts. Brown raved about the new-look ACC, and told league officials that the conference was ESPN’s highest-rated during the 2005 season. Miami’s game at Virginia Tech was the third-highest rated in ESPN history. The season-opening primetime game between FSU and Miami, meanwhile, was ABC’s highest-rated of the season. (That was also the game when, upon the camera scanning the crowd and landing upon Jenn Sterger, Brent Musburger famously — or, infamously — said, “Fifteen-hundred red-blooded Americans just decided to apply to Florida State.”)


It was good, then, to be a part of the ACC. UNC won the 2005 national championship in men’s basketball, in a time when that sport still commanded significant television investment, relative to football. In football, the 12-team ACC was a ratings hit in its first year. The league’s inaugural championship football game, an FSU victory against Virginia Tech in a full stadium in Jacksonville, was ABC’s fourth highest-rated game of the season. “I can tell you we’re very pleased with the ratings the ACC put up last year,” Brown said at the 2006 spring meetings. “They were terrific.” Swofford, then almost a decade into his tenure as ACC Commissioner, looked like a wizard. He’d led the league’s expansion from nine schools to 12. He’d put the conference in a position to thrive, from a football TV perspective. With FSU and Miami on opposite sides of new divisions in football, it was fair then to envision years of ACC championship games between the two.


And in some alternate dimension, maybe it happened. Maybe the Seminoles and Hurricanes played for the league title every year, or every other year, or maybe every third or fourth year. Maybe they were both good enough, at the same time, for their regular season games to matter, too. Maybe their rivalry remained what it was throughout much of the 1980s and 90s. Maybe in that different world there were more Wide Rights and more top-5 match-ups; more unfiltered Musburger hijinks and more games everyone wanted to watch. In this one, though, it never happened that way. FSU entered into a football malaise after that 2005 league championship. Miami in almost 20 years of ACC membership has never been what it was before joining. The Hurricanes have won a league title in men’s basketball, but are without one in football. And the promise of regular FSU-Miami ACC football title games? The next one will be the first.


A window closed. A BAD TIME FOR A FOOTBALL SLUMP In any other time in college athletics history, the ACC’s relative football slump in the mid-to-late 2000s might not have mattered as much, in a financial sense. But this was not any other time. This was, to the contrary, a time when football strength, and having attractive football games to sell, as TV inventory, came to matter more than anything. It was the worst time for a conference’s most valuable football brands to enter into prolonged dormancy but that’s what happened, and quickly. FSU during the 2006 season endured a 30-0 home loss against Wake Forest, and became mired in mediocrity in Bobby Bowden’s final seasons. Miami became the nation’s most consistently disappointing program. Virginia Tech, while maintaining its presence in the top 25, was never quite what it was in the early 2000s...
 
Part 3: https://www.charlotteobserver.com/sports/college/article288417309.html

Clemson, meanwhile, had not yet elevated its program. And no other ACC school emerged. If the ACC’s first football championship game was a hit, its second — a snoozer of a 9-6 Wake Forest victory against Georgia Tech — was a comparative disaster. Boston College then made the next two league title games after that, losing both to Virginia Tech. With FSU and Miami down, and with nobody else picking up the slack, a national narrative began to take hold: ACC football was weak. A joke. Fair or not, the narrative persisted. It still does, in a way.

While the conference entered into a period of football struggle it could not have foreseen, the Big Ten Network launched in August 2007. At the same time, that conference entered into a new, separate contract with ESPN. For years, Swofford and the ACC had prided themselves on leading the nation in college sports “television matters,” as Swofford had put it more than 15 years earlier. Now all the league could do was watch. “I was with Jim last week, and I told him, ‘Congratulations,’” Swofford said in 2007, referring to his friend and rival, Jim Delany, a fellow UNC alum who was then the Big Ten Commissioner. “It’s one of those things where the Big Ten will be a trailblazer, and that’s to their credit.

“The rest of us will get to learn a bit from what they do because of the timing.”

The Big Ten Network proved to be a financial success beyond anyone’s imagination. Two years after its launch, the SEC began a 15-year deal with ESPN worth more than $2 billion, in addition to a separate deal with CBS that guaranteed $55 million annually over the same time. Between 2006 and 2010, the ACC went from being the nation’s wealthiest conference to a distant third, and entered into a financial hole, relative to its peers, that has only grown deeper. In 2010, the ACC distributed an average of $11.7 million to its members. The Big Ten, meanwhile, distributed an average of more than $20 million, and the SEC more than $18 million. It took another four years for the ACC to catch up to those numbers, before the Big Ten and SEC again distanced themselves, in a financial sense. By then, in 2014, Maryland had left the ACC for the Big Ten. The ACC, chasing TV markets, had added Pittsburgh and Syracuse. It entered into an awkward part-time relationship with Notre Dame, and replaced Maryland with Louisville. The conference agreed to a lengthy contract with ESPN, and its member schools signed a Grant of Rights agreement that appeared, on the surface, to make further defections an impossibility.

In 2014, the ESPN-backed SEC Network launched. In 2015, the Big Ten and SEC both became the first conferences to distribute average full-share payouts of more than $30 million to their members. In 2016, the ACC and ESPN announced a 2019 launch date for the ACC Network. It was a long three-year wait. The revenue disparity grew wider. And wider. By 2018, schools in the Big Ten were receiving more than $50 million each, and more than $40 million in the SEC. The so-called Power Five was fast becoming a misnomer. Two conferences had separated themselves. The race for survival was on. An almost 30-year marriage began to fracture. RECORD ACC REVENUE IS STILL NOT ENOUGH In the 20 years between 2002 and 2022, ACC revenue increased by more than 528%, from $98.1 million to $617 million. The conference continues to set revenue records, almost every year. The problem, for the ACC, is that while 528% revenue growth over two decades might sound impressive, it is not compared to its longtime rivals and peers. During the same span, SEC revenue increased by 576%, and Big Ten revenue by 709%. They both generated more than $800 million in revenue during the 2021-22 fiscal year, and both are in a race to become college sports’ first billion-dollar conference. They will both soon cross that threshold, and both recently entered into new TV deals that will make them even wealthier.

Those deals will expire before the ACC’s ESPN contract ends in 2036 — though Florida State claims in its lawsuit that the conference’s deal actually ends in 2027, unless ESPN decides to extend it. Regardless, the financial disparity between the ACC and Big Ten and SEC will continue to grow, which is why FSU, and now Clemson, is attempting to sue itself out of the league. The ACC is involved in five lawsuits, two with FSU and two with Clemson. The other is in Florida, where Ashley Moody, the state attorney general, has sued the conference in an attempt to make its deal with ESPN a public record. Florida State has based several of its claims on how the ACC negotiated that contract, with FSU arguing the conference failed its membership. Some of those arguments seem to stretch legal credence. Others read like the grievances of a scorned partner, with FSU alleging that Swofford, now three years into retirement, negotiated in bad faith with ESPN to protect Raycom, where his son happened to hold an executive position. If tied to the Grant of Rights, which the ACC argues is legally binding and enforceable, FSU’s lawyers have said it would cost the school between $570 million and $700 million to exit the conference. That would be more than FSU has received from the ACC throughout its 33-year membership, which officially began in the summer of 1991. Over the past 20 years, FSU has received $420.3 million from the ACC. The conference sent $38.6 million to the school in 2022, but SEC schools received an average of almost $50 million that year, and Big Ten schools almost $60 million.

Thus the rush toward greener pastures, wherever they might be and however and whenever the Seminoles might get there. For many in Tallahassee, the divorce can’t come soon enough. There is a sense there, whether grounded in reality or not, that FSU has been victimized; that the ACC and most of its membership has taken more from Florida State than they’ve given. That was not true through the first 10 to 15 years of FSU’s ACC membership, when basketball revenue carried more weight. But in more recent years? Indeed, Florida State has proven its status as a ratings draw in football. In 32 ACC seasons, it has won the conference championship 16 times. When FSU joined the ACC, the league made more TV money from basketball. Now football accounts for 80% of the conference’s television income. Certainly, FSU is responsible for a lot of it. Already, rumors abound of remarriage. FSU would be a commodity to another league. “People that I was close to when I was raising money, they call me about every other day,” Charlie Barnes, a longtime executive with Seminole Boosters, said during a recent interview over lunch in Tallahassee. The inquiries, Barnes said, go like this: “What’s going to happen, what’s going to happen? I’ve heard that we’re joining the Big Ten. What’s the inside dope?”
 
"to take a break from other people having an conversation that they are enjoying, let me spam multiple paragraphs of an article nobody wants to read and bring the thread to a screeching halt again"
 
Part 4: https://www.charlotteobserver.com/sports/college/article288417309.html

Barnes is among a dwindling number of people who held influential positions at and around FSU in 1990, when the school was deciding what to do. In those days, and for years before and after, Barnes accompanied Bobby Bowden on a statewide booster tour. For 34 years, Barnes drove the Seminoles’ folksy and beloved football coach all around Florida, from Jacksonville to Ocala to Orlando to Fort Lauderdale, and everywhere else. In the early days and through the early-to-mid 90s, they’d ride through the night and stop at gas stations to fill up, and make a run inside for cigars and chewing tobacco. During one of those stops in 1990, around when the SEC was still considering Arkansas and FSU, Barnes asked Bowden what he preferred: the ACC, where everyone knew FSU would have its way, or the SEC, which Bowden grew up adoring as an Alabama native. As Barnes remembers it, Bowden said, “We have enough talent now. I don’t really care.” In the SEC, though, he said, “Us and Arkansas — we’re gonna be the pledge class,” and as an aging fraternity man, Bowden knew life could be rough on pledges.

Barnes, for one, wanted the SEC. So did the majority of FSU fans, he said. Instead, he found himself at his first ACC basketball tournament a couple years later, there to witness the spectacle and the pageantry. The basketball money was good and the tournament still mattered, financially and otherwise, but Barnes felt out of place. He wasn’t alone. “The ACC viewed us like Mr. Drysdale viewed the Clampetts,” Barnes said, referencing the “hillbillies” of The Beverly Hillbillies fame. At Barnes’ first ACC Tournament, “everybody there was resplendent in blue blazers and the khaki pants. They all look like ACC people. “And here comes our people. Oh, my God. They come in looking like a gypsy caravan.” The cultures never quite melded. The day Florida State accepted its ACC invitation in 1990, the school fielded hundreds of requests for basketball season tickets. There was anticipation, too, about getting in on the ACC Tournament. Thirty-four years later, college basketball isn’t what it was. ACC Tournament tickets are now available with ease. What was sacred no longer is.

The night after Barnes shared stories of touring Florida with Bowden, of raising money for Seminole Boosters for decades, FSU hosted N.C. State in men’s basketball in a mostly-empty Donald L. Tucker Center. It made for a depressing scene. Not far down the street, meanwhile, a massive renovation project had begun at Doak Campbell Stadium.

When FSU joined the ACC, the stadium still retained some of its charms. It was known in those days as The Erector Set. The arrival in the ACC, though, allowed FSU some of the financial resources to make it spiffy. A brick facade soon surrounded the exterior. Then came the addition of 20,000 seats. It became a college football palace in the 1990s, when the Seminoles won the first two of their three national titles. By late February, the stands on the press box side had been demolished. A large number of longtime season ticket holders had been displaced. A bare, orange-tinted plot of dirt remained where the stands used to be, an odd and surreal sight. FSU is rebuilding that half of the stadium and replacing the old with what Seminole Boosters describes as “a number of new, modern seating experiences.” There will be luxury suites and club seats and, for a price, those who lost their old seats can buy the newer, more expensive ones. A lot of people aren’t happy about it. Especially those who watched what Bowden built from seats now gone. But that’s what progress looks like. That’s the pursuit of more. In Tallahassee, knocking down almost half of a football stadium has been the easy part in recent months. The ACC’s Grant of Rights has proven sturdier, at least for now.
 
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