TuffaloDeac10
🌹☭
I'm looking for the long history of incompetence at fighting inflation...
BUMP to discuss Merkley's plan
Doesn't seem feasible or safe, but it's not like I've done an extensive analysis of it. This organization will start right off the bat with negative equity and huge cash flow problems. Even if bondholders are willing to put up the capital for the project at reasonable interest rates, which is highly unlikely[SUP]1[/SUP], there is literally no way for the organization to keep up with payments[SUP]2[/SUP]. Any gains from the mortgages have already been sacrificed to the banks in order to get them to refinance. At the end of the day, the difference will have to be made up by the taxpayer, or the bondholders will be wiped out. Given the scale of the asset purchases he is proposing, this would be devastating to the financial system. And this isn't even taking into account the possibility of default, which is still likely for subprime debtors, even at lower rates.
That's only if you accept Keynesian theory from the outset. Also, if basic Keynesian theory were correct, given the size of the expansionary measures taken, the recovery should have been much sharper, regardless of the severity of the recession[SUP]1[/SUP].
Nothing, really[SUP]2[/SUP], but then again I kind of have a problem with economy-wide models[SUP]3[/SUP]. They are pedagogically useful, but their explanatory powers are weak[SUP]2[/SUP], and they often make for horrible policy prescriptions[SUP]3[/SUP]. It's easy to say, "Ah! Aggregate demand has fallen, we must shift the LM curve to the right in order to make up for output[SUP]4[/SUP]. But grouping the entire loanable funds market together and failing to understand the nuanced outcomes that can occur when you rapidly expand the money supply leads to unintended consequences. See: Phillips Curve
Unconventional easing. I think I've been clear about that
Unconventional in what way? The easing we've been undertaking has already been unconventional. We've practically cleared the market of mortgage-backed securities in an attempt to push down mortgage rates. That's in addition to the federal funds rate already being zero. The economy isn't faltering for lack of action by the Fed.
There's a lot of ways to be unconventional. We could debase the currency to boost exports through more favorable exchange rates, buy more state/local bonds, have the Fed solve the Eurozone crisis itself, etc etc. It could announce that it would accept higher inflation in the face of declining unemployment and increased commuting pressures on energy prices and upward pressure on rents. It could promise not to take the punch bowl away. There's still a lot the Fed can do, it just seems to lack the will.
I harp on the Fed as much as I do because it can still act, Congress is utterly useless right now so there's not much point discussing fiscal stimulus (which I would prefer).
More here and here
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/m...-bernanke.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&ref=magazine
http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/what-constrains-federal-reserve-interview-joseph-gagnon
None of these things are guaranteed to work, and they all carry considerable risks, especially a higher target inflation rate[SUP]1[/SUP]. The logic behind allowing a faster rate of inflation is the same logic behind the Phillips Curve. It's astounding to me that people still advocate such a policy[SUP]2[/SUP]. Krugman argues that higher inflation will encourage people to spend faster. This could be true, but it could also just encourage people to shift their savings to riskier investments. It will push up long term interests rates, which will harm the economy, and it will hurt consumers. Krugman has been staring at data series too long, and has forgotten that often times it's better to just use common sense. Most people don't have money to just spend. It's not like they are just sitting on a bunch of cash and are just waiting for prices to go up to give them an incentive to spend it. Most people are riddled with debt. The only thing a higher target inflation rate will do is punish savers who are just trying to make it to retirement[SUP]3[/SUP].
The problem with the Fed trying to fix the economy is that changes in the money supply only have a short term effect on the real economy, but they have long-term effects on nominal economy, which, in general is why the dual mandate is ridiculous. Despite Krugman's many statements to the contrary, Bernanke understands this, which is why he advocated such strong action by Japan in the '90s, but has done little since the financial crisis. There has been no inconsistency on his part. Japan was experiencing a severe liquidity shortage and at several points declining prices. This is something that the Bank of Japan could have done something about, but zero-interest rates were not strong enough to counteract the deflationary pressures and expand the credit markets. This is why Bernanke suggested that the Bank of Japan should have taken alternative measures. Not because of Japanese unemployment, which wasn't even that bad. At its highest, their unemployment rate reached about 5.5%[SUP]4[/SUP].
Our economy, on the other hand, is not facing such deflationary pressures or defunct loanable funds markets. Monetary ineptitude is not what is keeping the economy in the doldrums. The thing I find most ironic is that Krugman intimates that Bernanke is wilting under political pressure[SUP]5[/SUP]. But let's be honest, Krugman has political motives for urging such strong action himself. He is a brilliant economist, but he's also a hack. He has demonstrated willingness to change his opinion solely based on who is in office. In 2003, he was sounding the alarms about how huge budget deficits would cause the bond market to call B.S. on the federal government, leading to soaring interest rates. These days, he has shown no such concern about the deficit, and indeed, has advocated for the massive expansion of the deficit. Why the inconsistency?[SUP]6[/SUP] So he could lend his economic credibility to a condemnation of the Iraq War.[SUP]7[/SUP]
We need to stop talking about Iraq before someone comes over and derails our thread. Deal?
1 If we confined ourselves to things guaranteed to work, we'd live in a pretty shitty world. If you're saying that it would be nice to have more natural experiments to look at than we currently do, I agree. But it seems we're (both US and much of the world) in an unenviable position of being the natural experiment, unless we want to say that we're in the Great Depression pt 2 or the Little Depression and need massive fiscal stimulus and/or currency devaluations to restore demand and reduce debt burdens on debtors (this is what I want to say, obviously). We might as well make the most of it, and I suspect we will, one way (my ways) or the other (your's/Paul Ryan's ways, although there's a lotta Sneaky Keynesian policies in the tax cut/delayed spending cut plans)[SUP]1[/SUP]. Of course there's also the chance that there's no decisive action one way or the other and we just stay in our Little Depression for the next decade or so. :/
2 Sure, but just because the Phillips Curve breaks down when policymakers try to exploit it doesn't mean there aren't trade-offs between employment/output and inflation in the short-run.[SUP]2[/SUP] Obviously I don't think an exogenous positive employment shock is coming on its own, but let's say one does, we'd then have a demand shock and upward pressure on wages, housing, commodity, and other prices.[SUP]3[/SUP]The Phillips Curve fails as a policy tool because announced inflation affects expectations of costs as well as revenues. I don't think the central bank saying it would accept the inflationary pressures of new hiring is the same as saying that it's going to create inflation itself and expects producers to hire, or else. I also expect that since many unions are profoundly weaker now than in the 1970s, that the Phillips Curve today is a lot flatter than the 1960s-early70s and the inflationary pressures might not be so great. Again, I think this specific action (Bernanke saying he'd be ok with inflation going above target after being below target for so long) is pretty passive.
3 Feels like a good spot to post this, which I enjoyed reading.[SUP]4[/SUP]
4 Sure, but Japan was running a current account surplus through it's 18 year long Lost Decade. I'm not sure we'd have our unemployment problem if we had their current account surplus. And I think there's plenty of room for upward distortions in the nominal economy, based on how far below long-run trend we are. I don't think this drop and lack of catch-up growth is due to a drop in productivity or a contraction of the PPF.[SUP]5[/SUP]
5 A major US political party with a ~40% chance of winning the Presidency just announced a commodity basket bug (this really lacks the punch of "Gold bug") for VP. Bernanke got drilled by Republican lawmakers last time he went before the JEC, there was hardly a peep from the Democrats. I mean Jim DeMint basically came out and advocated for expansionary austerity in one of his questions. We're living in a world where Peter Schiff has authored a Top 1000 book on Amazon overall* and the #1 selling public finance book (also outselling End This Depression Now!). This is nuts. There's political pressure on the Fed, alright, but it's not from my side.[SUP]6[/SUP]
6 Because Keynesian stimulus measures are necessarily short-run and a ten-year tax cut with set to expire in an election year is semi-permanent (tax stickiness, if you would).[SUP]7[/SUP] We used to have government surpluses as far as the eye could see and the Bush tax cuts and wars of political convenience were oddly-timed and oddly-chosen ways to end the era of Clinton-Gingrich surpluses and Krugman thought the bond vigilantes would be PO'ed. Seems like a reasonable prediction to make about the future actions of bondholders. When that prediction isn't born out, and we have bondholders across the globe fleeing to safety (~2008 to present), it makes sense to think we're not in immediate danger. "When the facts change, I change my mind" and all that.
7 If only more people had lent whatever credibility they had to stop that war
*The Top 1000 is apparently volatile, Schiff's book moved from the 900s to 1400s in one day.
Sorry it took so long to respond to this. I had a huge response typed out, and then I lost it.
1. I'm not sure where you got the impression that I totally reject the works of Keynes[SUP]1[/SUP]. He was undoubtedly the most important economist of the 20th century. In fact, I would describe myself as a New Keynesian, in the mold of a Greg Mankiw or Ken Rogoff. The problem is with economics in general. Politicians have decided that what they think is right, and then they go searching for economists to substantiate their views. More often than not, these economists are perfectly willing to oblige. They will distort the facts and the data to arrive at the conclusion they want, no matter how tortured their logic is[SUP]2[/SUP]. Rejecting the arguments of Krugman, Stiglitz, and Eggertsson isn't the same as rejecting the works of Keynes.
I have expressed reservations about the construction of economy-wide models, wherein economists simply plug in exogenous changes, and determine the outcome based on what the model says. Unfortunately, substantial liberties are taken in the construction of these models, and assumptions are made that are not remembered later on down the road when comparative statics are performed. Keynes did not do this so much. He described short-term incentives and causal relationships, but it was only Hicks who turned this into an economy-wide model.
2. Of course it means that there isn't a trade-off. A trade-off implies a perfect causal relationship. The causal relationship between employment and inflation is far, far, far less than perfect. In fact, the Phillips Curve ignores the single greatest factor in inflation, the money supply[SUP]3[/SUP].
3. You're right, an exogenous employment shock isn't coming, because employment is an endogenous variable. If you are going to treat it as an exogenous variable, you have to account for which actual exogenous variables changed to bring about the positive employment shock, and then determine what effects that those variables will have on the rest of the economy, and inflation in particular. Again, this cutting of corners is another huge problem in the modern macroeconomic discipline.
And you don't think the Federal Reserve is accepting the inflationary pressures of new hiring right now? Where are interest rates right now? The Federal Reserve is encouraging these pressures. You might be right if there were any indications that the Fed would immediately respond to 4% inflation with a policy rule change, but the Fed has announced over and over again that they aren't raising rates until at least 2014[SUP]4[/SUP]. If anything, the low interest rates are hampering employment, because they are encouraging businesses to invest in physical capital at low cost rather than labor[SUP]5[/SUP].
4. I don't even know where to start with this study. Actually, I do. It's with the obvious weak link, the idea of the "paradox of toil" first proposed by Eggertsson, never shown empirically, and now accepted as the linchpin of Krugman's whole argument [SUP]6[/SUP]. I read Eggertsson's original study proposing the paradox of toil a while back, and, to my shock, it relied on convoluted logic that made no sense in the short run. Basically, what they are saying is that when interest rates reach the zero lower bound, the entire economy turns on its head an normal incentives don't apply anymore. It's comical, to say the least. What was most offensive about it, was that Eggertsson actually suggested that this "paradox of toil" was the natural counterpart to the paradox of thrift.
The paradox of thrift applies in all macroeconomic situations, and makes sense as an intuitive cause-and-effect response to decreased demand. The "paradox of toil" makes no sense intuitively, applies only in a special case, and uses four to five interlinked causal relationships. This is an example of economists torturing theory to make it say what they want if I have ever seen one. There is absolutely no evidence to back up Eggertsson's claim, and yet Krugman seems gleefully willing to toss the entire economic discipline out the door to reach the conclusion that he wants to reach.
5. So what? Their current account surplus is more than offset by the lack of domestic demand. If their current account surplus was really the reason for their low unemployment, then we'd have seen higher levels of growth during the Lost Decade.
6. Who's in the White House? I rest my case. I guarantee you that Bernanke is feeling more pressure from the Administration than he is from Congressional Republicans[SUP]7[/SUP].
7. Necessarily short-run? Spending has increased from around 20% of GDP to around 25% of GDP from 2008 to 2012. That's four years, and if that isn't traversing into the realm of the long-run, then huge deficits for the next two years will push us there. Four years is more than enough time for businesses to adjust their capital allocation strategies accordingly[SUP]8[/SUP].