1. Disagree, and I think this perception is generally unhelpful.
2. I'm more concerned by the fact that it's one data point (the most recent month on Case-Shiller) and that there are still a lot of headwinds out there than I'm worried about rates being "artificially" low. I mean, there's not exactly a lot of economic activity going on, so it makes sense that yields would suck and shitty yields -> cheaper loans because savers don't have better options.
3. I don't think rates will rise until their rising would no longer pose an existential threat to the world economy.
4. This seems to be a popular take, but I'm not sure how convincing it is. I know Greenspan is now seen as some witch-doctor who cut rates whenever a recession came along, creating a new bubble, but that's basically textbook Fed policy to loosen money when a demand-shock recession comes along. Krugman has a neat chart in
The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 regarding "Greenspan's bubbles," but I don't think it was so much monetary policy (low rates) that got us into this mess, though rates were historically low before and are historically lower now. I think TR and I both agree that poor regulatory oversight was far more culpable (still Greenspan's fault, mind you), though he places more blame on the regulators while I blame both the regulators and Congress for making a shitty regulatory framework. Some people go further than that and blame rising income inequality as well. I think there might be an uncomfortably non-neoliberal case that factor price equalization (free trade lowering the world price of low-to-medium skilled labor in the US) hollowed out the US middle class, forcing it to turn to debt instead of income to finance their lifestyles, but I still wouldn't blame monetary policy for that outcome (seems like a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't situation, plus better urban policies could have alleviated some of those stresses). Anyhow, I don't think blame for the crisis falls at the feet of monetary policy (certainly at the feet of some of the policymakers, though for other reasons), so I think the Fed can play a constructive role in getting us out, even at the ZLB.